India and Russia relationships cold War to 1947

India and Russia Relation

The foundation of the India-Russia relations was laid during the Cold War era. After the Cold War ended, the initial years of Boris Yeltsin's rule were not smooth. Otherwise, India and Russia have had a relationship that has nurtured as friction-free in the last many decades, with both nations having a strategic vision about each other for many years. 

In the post-Cold War period, the relationship is strong but lacks direction, though officially, in 2000, India and Russia became strategic partners, reiterating a special and privileged partnership when Dmitry Medvedev visited in 2010. 

Russia, however, is not comfortable with the growing Indo-US proximity. During the Cold War, defense ties were the most important elements of our relationship. In the post-Cold War era, the US, France, and Israel have emerged as direct competitors to Russia in providing defense supplies to India. In 2012, the two nations celebrated the 65th-anniversary of diplomatic relations and reaffirmed their cordial bilateral relations.

India Russia Diplomatic Relations During the Cold War

Though the Soviets did support India in 1959 when the Chinese adopted a hard-line position on the border, in 1962, during the Sino-Indian war, the Soviets stood along with the Chinese theory that the border between India and China is a colonial legacy. 

To rectify this tilt, the Soviet Union, post the 1962 war, r support of arms to India which helped a lot in the 1965 war. Gradually, in the early 1970s, the world witnessed tectonic shifts, the most important of which was the US tilt towards China. This was perceived by the USSR as a threat to them. These events again led to mega-regional shifts. 

India-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship

In the 1970s, the US explored options of undertaking rapprochement with China, and India began to fear a Beijing Washington-Islamabad axis. Henry Kissinger did not send positive vibes to India and tried to make it dear that an Indo-Pak conflict could also come to involve China. India acted hastily. 

Since 1969, India and the USSR were negotiating a diplomatic and strategic engagement. India speeded up the negotia Hons and in 1971, concluded a twenty-year India-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship. 

The treaty gave India the needed strategic support from Russia in any eventuality of conflict. Shipments of arms began to arrive from Russia to India. After the creation of Bangladesh towards the end of 1971, the India-Russia treaty acted as a great strategic stabilizer for India and the region as it deterred any Chinese or American intervention unfavorable to India.

The Soviets also vetoed the UN resolutions that advanced that India and Pakistan undertake a cease-fire. Soviet support successfully helped India to neutralize the external threats and helped it safeguard its territory. 

After the 1971 war, when India conducted the nuclear test in 1974, the Soviets did not con damn it and, in fact, went on to support India with the supply of heavy water for the nuclear program that got halted when American and Canadians took back their supplies. India, on the other hand, also showed outright support to the Soviet Union. In 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, India

India Russia Diplomatic Relations Up To India's Independence

The origin of Indo-Russian ties in the modern era can be understood through the colonial prism. The period of the early nineteenth century saw the Russian Tsar expand to Central Asia. The British perceived this as a threat to the sovereignty of the British Indian Empire. The British were now determined to halt Russian advancement beyond Central Asia. In order to stop the same, the British started the Anglo-Afghan wars.

The primary aim of the wars was to make regions in Afghanistan a buffer to protect the British Indian territory. The ultimately unfolding of the Great Game by the British and Russians would accept the British as the paramount power in Afghanistan. When the Russian and the British agreed to respect each other's interests, the Great Game concluded with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. This revolution and the subsequently established Soviet Russian state distanced Russia from India. The leaders of the early Soviet Union were not keen on supporting the Indian National Movement. 

The Russian leaders thought that the Indian national movement against British colonialism is a bourgeois-led movement and did not have strong revolutionary potential. They felt that a strong revolutionary impulse was needed to fight against imperial rule, which the Indians somewhat lacked. Further, as the Indian National Movement progressed, Russia got busy with their own internal concerns, as a result of which, up until the very end of the Second World War, India and Russia had very limited interaction.

India Russia Relationship

India - Russia Relations , Defence Diplomacy | Strange Military Stories

Defence Diplomacy of India- Russia

The defence diplomacy began between India and Russia after 1962. The defence relation has persisted over a period of time and has become the bedrock of mutual trust. More than 70 per cent of Indian defence equipment today is of Russian origin. 

These weapons have also proved their worth at a time when India needed them in conflict. During the Cold War, to save forex, the two sides have used rupee-rouble agreements, which significantly contributed in helping India save forex, India, in the 1980s, resorted to a twin policy of diversification and domestic industrial development in defence. Russia helped India with technology transfers. 

At the end of the Cold War, there was a global decline in arms trade but India and China remained top importers. The priority for India in the post-Cold War period was to ensure that it had a reliable spare parts supplier. Crisis of vast military-industrial complexes of the Soviet and their failure to sustain at the end of the Cold War led India to seek alternative routes. 

India explored the possibility of Israel and France, along with the US, acting as potential suppliers. In the first decade following the end of the Cold War saw Russia trying to consolidate its military-industrial complexes. However, one concern did remain Indian armed forces complained about problems in spare parts and issues in the maintenance of Russian equipment. Part of the blame is on Indian defence and foreign policy negotiations that failed to develop a deeper perspective on the life cycle of products. 

When they were negotiating projects, agreements on product life cycle needed to be taken care of. At times, we ended up taking some equipment that became obsolete late after a few years and its production plants also shut down, thereby making spare parts availability a huge concern. 

India Russia Relations after 2000

Russia created the Rosoboronexport in 2000, which is a state intermediary body that monopolises arms export. India raises the issue of support after sales at almost all India-Russia Intergovernmental Commissions on Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) and this platform helps us to resolve our issues. Despite certain concerns, India continues to have robust defence cooperation with Russia as the arms have proved their mettle and majority of our arms are of Soviet origins, which have come to be well accepted in the Indian military circles. 

Since 2007, the two are working on developing a fifth-generation combat aircraft. The MiG-35 has had India embark upon a mega defence modernisation programme. The offset clause invoked under our defence procurement policy would now warrant more Russian as distance, and Russia has not shied away from helping India develop Indian military-industrial complex. Russia and India continue to have bilateral exercises and Russia continues to support us for supplies of multirole transport aircraft, combat aircraft, including an aircraft carrier admiral Gorchakov, inducted in the Indian navy in November 2013 as INS Vikramaditya.

Russia and India will continue to have joint development of weapons and continue to interact through institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation. India is undertaking domestic production of BrahMos missile, T-90 tank and Sukhoi aircraft, Indian reliance on Russia will not decrease despite diversification and delays in projects because Russia remains committed to defence technology transfer, which India feels it needs for the development of its domestic defence industry. Russia, similarly, will not reduce its dependence on India as India acts as the biggest testing ground for Russian weaponry. As China goes on to supply arms to developing nations in future, it will try to undercut the Russian influence, thus necessitating Russia to stay with India so as to be able to use India as a springboard to other developing markets despite an Indian tilt to the US.

Thus, both use defence cooperation to enhance their overall diplomatic engagement. Russians also continue to provide economic aid and cooperate with India on a case-to-case basis and Russia continues to deepen their its defence engagement through the bilateral arms trade.

India and Russia in 2019 have signed a USD 3 billion deal where Russia will refurbish and supply an Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (Chakra 3) to India. In the last 6 months of 2018, India and Russia have signed USD 10 billion worth deals that include S-400 (signed in 2018) and a joint venture to produce AK-203 rifles in Amethi (signed in 2019). The fact that most of the deals with Russia are being micromanaged by the PMO in India signifies the strategic intent.

India Russian jointly produce AK-203/103 rifles at Amethi

The AK-203 is a modernized 200 series AK-103 variant. The Indian government signed an agreement with Russia in 2019 to manufacture the AK-103 rifles for the Indian Army. Russia will manufacture the AK-103 in India. Even though Russia had sent the proposal for AK-103 to India in 2018, the deal could not be finalised because the requirement of the army was not fulfilled in the Russian proposal. In 2019, the army announced a new proposal. 

The army wanted to purchase 7.62 calibre assault rifles along with an import of a small bag of 'hi-tech rifles' for frontline troops on the border. The hi-tech rifles can be imported and the rest can be manufactured in India. The AK-103 is to be manufactured domestically and would be used for hinterland and counterinsurgency operations (with a preferred calibre of 5.56 mm and a 500 m range).

The army will also use AK-103 for paramilitary forces and also export in the long run. As per the agreement, Russia will set up a Kalashnikov factory in collaboration with Ordnance Factory Board in India and cater to rifle manufacturing for the needs of the army.

S-400 Missile System India - Russia Relations | Strange Military Stories

S-400 Missile Deal

In 2018, India and Russia signed a USD 5 billion deal (with no sovereign guarantee [a sovereign guarantee ns that the company that won the contract has to by law provide a guarantee from an international bank which can be encashed by the purchaser of the product in case delivery of the product does not happen on time despite the payments being made] but as a government-to-government deal) where India will purchase Russian Triumf-400 (five units) long-range surface-to-air missile system. 

India has decided to purchase the missile defence system that will shield any incoming ballistic missile directed towards the soil of India.

The NATO calls S-400 Triumf as SA-21 Growler, which is a modern long-range surface-to-air missile (MLRSAM). The S-400 Triumf (a fourth-generation MRSAM and a successor to S-200 and S-300) is more sophisticated and effective than the American Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system. 

To create a layered defence, the S-400 Triumf can be deployed in 5 minutes and fire three types of missiles. Within an altitude of 30 km and a range of 400 km, the S-400 Triumf can engage aerial targets, aircraft, UAV's and ballistic and cruise missiles. The two sides have developed their own systems of transactions including a national currency swap for payments (due to US CAATSA-explained below). 

It has the potential to target 100 airborne targets simultaneously including F-35 of the US. Russia has been using the S-400 Triumf since 2007 and in 2015 deployed them in Syria to guard Russian and Syrian naval and air assets. 

There are some S-400 Triumf units in the Crimean peninsula as well. China in 2015 purchased S-400 Triumf and has been using it since 2018. With the coming of S-400 Triumf, India will be able to tackle air and missile threats from Pakistan. 

Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)

However, in 2007, the US President signed Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The legislation was for Russia, Iran and North Korea. As per the Title II of the act, because of Russia intervention in Ukraine and meddling into US Presidential elections in 2016 any dealings by any state with the Russian gas, defence and security industry will invite sanctions. 

The section 235 of the act talks about 12 sanctions that can be imposed upon persons engaging in significant transactions (39 Russian entities identified by the US State Department, which includes space defence cooperation JSC, the manufacturer of S-400 Triumf) with the defence and intelligence of Russia. Section 231 gives powers to the US President to invoke 5 out of the 12 sanctions in section 235. However, India, Indonesia and Vietnam were granted a waiver under CAATSA, which conveys that India retained its strategic autonomy. 

More SO, India has this understanding that it needs to balance its relations with the US and Russia both. India needs Russia because it is endowed with natural resources and military technologies fruitful for Indian development and security. More importantly, based on India's past diplomatic engagement, Russia is more inclined to align to the interests of India in South Asia than the US. India also knows that as the US tries to withdraw from Afghanistan, it will need Russia more in Afghanistan (and beyond in Eurasia) than anyone else. 

More so, today, Russia is more crucial for us as it is more than willing to share those technologies that the US is not willing to share, like nuclear-powered submarines.