Iran Nuclear Deal

In 1953, the US president Eisenhower gave a speech at the UN General Assembly entitled "Atom for Peace' (AFP). The US was determined to use atomic technology for peaceful purposes within and among developing counties for civilian nuclear programmes. The recipient states were to use the nuclear technology only for civilian and peaceful purposes. The Iranian nuclear programme (INP) began in 195 when Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran entered into an agreement to cooperate on civilian use of atomi energy. 

In 1959, in the University of Tehran, the Iranian Shah established the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre and initiated negotiations with the US under AFP for civilian nuclear support. In 1967, the US established a 5 MW nuclear reactor with highly enriched uranium fuel to fuel the reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (NRC), which had the capacity to produce 600 g of plutonium per year in spent fuel. Akbar Etemad was the father of the INP. Under the AFP, Iranian scientists also got an opportunity to get trained in the US. In 1974, Iran created the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran to achieve the target of training manpower for 20 reactors in the next 20 years. Subsequently, in 1975, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran and MIT entered into an agreement to train Iranian nuclear scientists.

Things changed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. When the rule of the Shah came to an end in 1979, the US suspended all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Iran, on the other hand, continued to receive support from Russia, China and Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear arms bazaar. Russians helped Iranians in building a heavy water reactor in Iran that has capabilities to produce weapons grade plutonium. China assisted Iran with two sub-critical reactors and electromagnetic isotope separation technology for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre. 

Pakistan provided Iran with P-1 and P-2 centrifuges that were used to enrich the uranium. Pakistan also gave Iran technical drawings and advanced design for reactors. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini reduced the intensity of the INP, but the 1980 Iran-Iraq war brought about a rethinking in Iran about its nuclear programme. In 1983, Iran asked the IAEA to provide Iran assistance for technical help in setting up of a plant to provide uranium hexafluoride (UF6) required for enrichment. With assistance for France, Iran had established a home-grown facility to develop nuclear fuel at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTEC). The IAEA, under Article X1-A of its statute, was obligated to help a member state with such a project. In the same year, a team from the IAEA visited ENTEC to assist Iran

local expertise. Finally, due to the US pressure, however, the IAEA did not initiate any support. As time progressed, the US applied more pressure on the IAEA and other states to refrain from iting Iran. In 1995, then Iranian President Rafsanjani decided to break the ice and began to improve He gave a firm named Conoco a contract on 6 May 1995 to develop an Iranian offshore oil field in he Persian Gulf but the Clinton administration prevented the firm from going ahead. Clinton continued sanctions against Iran while Rafsanjani signed an agreement with Russia to begin work on completing the incomplete Bushehr plant. From 1976 to 2003, as per the subsidiary arrangements of the safeguards agreement between Iran and the IAEA, Iran had to report any new facility to the IAEA within 180 days along with providing information on any new location or outside facility. Since 1992, the subsidiary arrangement that were part of the safeguard agreement began to change but Iran was not a party to change in the safeguard agreements till 2003. The Iranian opposition party, Mujahideen Khalq Organisation (MKO), revealed that Iran had established a secret facility at Natanz. As Iran was not a party to the changing safeguard agreements till 2003, by not declaring the Natanz facility within 180 days, it did not violate any legal obligation of the IAEA.

Since 1992, the Board of Governors at the IAEA began to accept the subsidiary arrangement called modified Code 3.1, which required a member state to notify any decision to setup a new facility immediately. In 2003, Iran agreed to abide by the modified Code 3.1, but as the US sanctions continued, Iran refused to finally ratify the code. Iran began negotiations with the EU-3, that is, Britain, France and Germany. The talks led to the adoption of Sadabad Declaration between Iran, Britain, France and Germany, whereby Iran decided to suspend all uranium enrichment. This was followed in 2004 with the Paris Agreement. Under this, it was agreed that Iran and EU-3 will look for a long-term agreement to ensure an INP for peaceful purposes. The Sadabad Declaration and the Paris Agreement failed as Iran ud not get a security guarantee for any attack on Iran. Iran said that it got a box of chocolates out of deals, which was empty. Since 2006, Iran resumed enriched at its facility in Natanz. The belligerent policy of the US on Iran gave rise to a hardliner in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became the next president. The refusal of Iran to ratify the modified Code 3.1 led the US to send the Iranian dossier for sanctions to the UN Security Council. In 2009, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA declaring that it is constructing a second uranium enrichment facility at Fordo under the mountain. As the Iranian Majles had not ratified the modified Code 3.1, it was not bound to follow. Tensions between the US and Iran continued. In 2006, China, Russia and the US joined the group of EU-3, becoming the P5 + 1. Germany was a key trading partner of Iran and its nuclear programme depended upon German products and services. German firms like Siemens, MercedRLngi, Krapp and Volkswagen were also heavily operational with Iran. The negotiations of P5 +1 did not yield any results due to the presence of the hardliner Ahmadinejad. 

In 2012. ute election of Hassan Rouhani, things began to progress further. The first success was achieved n the as per the Geneva Accord, where a Joint Plan of Action was achieved. It was further negotiated 13, leading to a final Join Plan of Action (JCPOA) in June 2015. The 2013 Geneva deal acknowledge Iran has to accept that it would not enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. The deal accepted the ft it is a step-by-step solution where actions by Iran in good faith shall gradually lead to a comprehensive solution, and would finally involve an integrated whole, where nothing would be agreed upon everything would be agreed upon. Under the Geneva Agreement, Iran was not to enrich uranium beyond 5 per cent. Iran would make no advances of activities at facilities in Natanz, Arak and Fordo.

In 2015, under the Lausanne framework Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran has agreed not enrich uranium beyond 3-6 per cent. It retains the right for a peaceful nuclear programme. Iran woda cut centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,104, with 5,060 centrifuges for enrichment. This makes it tough for i to make a bomb. Iran would also reduce its stockpile from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, ensuring transparent in its peaceful use of nuclear technology. The IAEA will access all nuclear facilities of Iran and there be gradual lifting of sanctions. Iran has to address the concerns of the IAEA related to possible milit dimensions of its nuclear programme and has to redesign the heavy water facility at Arak and transfo the Fordo facility into a physics research centre. 

The Middle Eastern states had a mixed response to this arrangement. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the Lebanon's speaker Nabih Berri welcomed the deal, along with the Syrians. Saudi Arabia felt that the Iran deal allowed Iran to maintain a nuclear threshold and that the elimination of sanctions will economically revive Iran. A strong Iran will allow it to assert its hegemony over Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Though Israel has criticised the deal, we need to remember that Israel has actually never witnessed any existent threat from Iran. It has, however, faced regional competition post-withdrawal of sanctions For Israel, the real issue, therefore, is not the bomb but the regional balance of power. 

A nuclear Iran, even for civilian we threatens the decade-old strategy of allowing Israel to be an unrivalled military power of the Middle East Israel knows that allowing Iran to have a civilian nuclear facility means that Iran too shall have the flexibility to turn military in nature at a short notice. Such a situation would severely delimit the ability of Israel te be the only player in the Middle East to establish regional hegemony with 200-plus unmonitored nuclear warheads. For Saudi, the revival of the regional GCC to prepare for a long-term confrontation with Tehran is the only option. 

A renewed attempt to strengthen the Saudi-Pakistan axis is already underway. Iran has decided to follow the Chinese model. The idea is to get the sanctions removed and get rich and then use the wealth to establish Iran as a regional hegemony. Israel and Saudi Arabia both fear the dominance of Iran stretching from Beirut, Damascus to Baghdad and Aden. This fear is disturbing the balance of power in the Middle East post the 2015 Nuclear Deal.

What is H1B1 Visa

India-US Visa-Related Issues

The US government has the provision of an H-1B visa. It is a non-immigrant visa for temporary workers. It is given for select special occupations. The issue is that in the US, if a company like an IT firm cannot find a skilled US worker, it can attract skilled workers under the H-1B programme. The US population is sceptical about the majority of the jobs being given to outsiders as they allege that firms hire from abroad to cut costs as labour is cheaper if imported and this undermines the employment to US citizens. Indian citizens are one of the largest H-1B users in the US. 

In 2015, the US administration under Obama signed Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. As per the law, the visa fee will be increased and the rise in cash flow to government coffers will be used for financing Obama's healthcare and biometric tracking System. The hike in the fees is going to offset IT and BPO exports of India.

With the coming of Donald Trump as the new US president, India and the US have had some irritants their bilateral diplomacy. The H-1B visa issues have emerged as one of the greatest source of friction between the two countries. An employer has to apply for an H-1B visa for the employee with the US immigration department. At the same time, there is one L-1 visa category, which is an inter-company transfer category where the foreign worker can be temporarily transferred to the US in an executive or marginal position in the office of the same employer or its branch or subsidiary. Donald Trump has advocated changing the immigration system of the US and has asserted to make it more merit-based. The main logic of merit-based immigration is to ensure that the immigrants entering the US are highly skilled and contribute to the American economy. The goal of the new system is to have less low-skilled immigrants.

In March 2017, the Trump administration decided that the government shall not undertake fast track processing of H-1B visa applications from 3 April 2017, for the next 6 months so that the US immigration authorities can analyse the H-1B extension applications of visa holders whose visas are on the verge of expiry. India has been an aggressive advocate of a fair and a rational approach to be adopted on visa related issues. India's Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar had conveyed to the US lawmakers to treat the H-1B issue as a trade and service matter than treating it as an immigration issue. The private US firms can pay a premium of 1,225 US dollars per application. The payment of the premium ensures that the immigration department expedites the H-1B application and processes it in 15 days in contrast to the normal process of 6 months. The government of US has now stopped this practice. Under the Obama administration, a new H-4 visa programme was launched that enabled the spouse of the H-1B visa holders in the US to undertake jobs in the US. Trump administration has signalled a rollback of H-4 visa as well

The Trump administration placed the High-Skilled Integrity and Fairness Act of 2017 in front of the House of Representatives. The legislation has advocated for a market-based allocation of visas T legislation introduced mechanisms where companies can attract foreign talent by making it mandatory for Hu1B visa holder to have a minimum salary of 1,30,000 USD. This figure is double of what existed since 1989, that is, 60,000 USD. The legislation thus reduces the incentive to outsource jobs yet allowing an option to outsource jobs if the company expresses a willingness to pay. 

The legislation intends to promote fairness in hiring skilled workers globally by removing the per country cap for immigrant visa policy. To plug the loopholes in H-1B and L-1 visa programmes, the H-1B and L-1 visa reform acts were also envisaged In January 2017, the Protect and Grow American Jobs Act envisaged an increase in the minimum salary of H-1B visa holders and removal of the master's degree exemption. 

The H-1B reforms will affect Infosys, TCS, Wipro and so forth. More so, with the hike in the minimum salary for visa holders, the smaller firms may find it difficult to incur costs, thereby affecting their growth The profitability of the Indian IT sector would be affected as profits were maintained on the offshoring model. India has officially conveyed its concerns without taking up the matter through diplomatic channels. Indian firms in the US have now started recruiting domestic Americans as per the new requirements.

Nuclear Liability Law India US relation

When India and the US concluded the nuclear deal, to operationalise it, India had to ratify the convention a supplementary compensation on nuclear damages and also prepare a nuclear liability law. Subsequently, India prepared the Civil Liability of Nuclear Damages Act (INDIA) in 2010. 

The aim of the CLAN is o ensure that in case of a nuclear accident, the victim get quick compensation without having to prove negligence by operator or supplier. The liability was capped at 1,500 crore rupees. However, there are two issues raised by equipment suppliers in INDIA. The first issue of CLNDA is Section 17B, which states that in India, the plant operator in India, that is NPCIL, under Section 17B, can claim compensation from the supplier of equipment if it claims that the nuclear accident that happened was due to faulty equipments or material supplied by the supplier. 

The second issue is related to Section 46. As per this section, the accident victims can sue both operator and material supplier over and above the amount capped. Now equipment suppliers, which are foreign players, say that these clauses (Section 17B and Section 46) put the supplier in a vulnerable situation and unnecessarily drag them into open-ended criminal action and tort law compensation. The suppliers say that the operator and not the supplier has to identify defects and get them rectified and in case of the failure of the operator to do so, the operator is to be held liable. The suppliers also say that India's CLNDA violates the Paris Convention of 1960 and the Vienna Convention of 1963 as well as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages (CSC).

The government has tried to give some assurance to the suppliers by saying that as per Section 7 of CLNDA, if the liability exceeds 1,500 crore cap, the central government will establish a nuclear liability fund to protect the suppliers from any claims made by the operator, However, suppliers have pointed out that Section 7 of the CLNDA still does not protect a supplier from claims made by accident victims under the law of torts. In 2015, the US president Obama visited India. During the visit, the two sides finalised administrative arrangements to execute the nuclear deal. This was built upon the India PM's visit to the US in 2014 when a contact group to implement the deal had been established. 

After the successful completion of negotiation in the contact group, India agreed to establish a nuclear insurance pool formed by General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC) and 4 different PSUs, which will contribute 750 crores out of a total of 1,500 crores, while the government will contribute the rest of the amount. The insurance pool will provide cover to suppliers under Section 17 of the INDIA. Now under the pool the operator and suppliers will become partners in risk management rather than eyeing each other as adversaries. The compensation amount is three hundred million in special drawing rights (SDR) and INDIA has capped maximum liability for an operator to 1,500 crore rupees. In case if value of SDR increases and goes beyond 1,500 crores, the government would bridge the amount. 

On 12 June 2015, the General Insurance Company of India has launched the Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool with a capacity of 1,500 crores as envisaged under CLNDA.

Cyber war | what is cyber warefare| cyberspace

Cyber warfare

Actions by a nation-state actor to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or critical infrastructure is known as cyber warefare.

Cyber crime

Somewhere in the South China Sea, a US and European missile cruiser on joint patrol stray too close to one of China's many man-made islands. Illegally built and hardened with military facilities- despite a ruling to their illegality by The Hague in international court- China has warned repeatedly that it will not tolerate any other nation's military presence near the controversial islands. 

The United States and the European Union meanwhile have both taken the side of many of the South China Sea's lesser nations, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, who see the military build-up as an incursion into their sovereign water  and an attempt to bully them into submission. Refusing to bow before Chinese aggression,the US and European militaries have routinely engaged in freedom of navigation exercises through the disputed man-made island chains. Yet this patrol is different. The local Chinese commander- acting on his own or perhaps with authority from his chain of command- orders a Chengdu J-20 combat patrol into the air. Armed with anti-ship missiles, the jets super cruise to within a few dozen miles of their targets, but this time instead of warning off the European and American ships, they are ordered to retaliate for the incursion. 

On board the European cruiser, alarms soundas three of the four Chinese aggressors loose a volley of anti-ship missiles. Immediately the ship syncs up with its American counterparts via a wireless communications link, and together the two ship's powerful AEGIS systems track the incoming missiles and fire off countermeasures. One ship protecting the other, supersonic interceptors fire off from the decks of both ships, eight tasked with intercepting the incoming missiles and another eight screaming into the night sky to take out the Chinese jets. The exchange between the two sides lasts just forty five seconds, at the end of which three Chinese planes are fiery wrecks, with one having landed a hit on the European cruiser and killing dozens of sailors.

Military comm networks relay news of the confrontational light speed to commanders around the globe, and within minutes air, sea, and ground forcesacross Asia, Europe, and America are gearing up for World War III. Yet within just seconds of the news of the attack on the European and American ships, a new generation of weapons have already been deployed. Less than a minute after news of two dozendead European sailors and three downed Chinese pilots reach the desks of their respective military commanders, cyberweapons have already gone on the offensive, a digital war sweeping across the internet at the speed of light, and catching the entire world in its wake.

Such a scenario may seem a bit far-fetched,yet it's an eventuality that every day militaries all over the world prepare for. In fact, every single day a digital war takesplace amidst the background chatter of daily internet use, with nations attacking each other's critical infrastructure looking for vulnerabilities. Considered a 'soft war', these attacks aremeant to look for and stockpile potential vulnerabilities in the digital systems that are the lifeblood of modern nations. Energy grids, communications and financial networks are the primary targets, and while no nation is yet launching an offensive to actually cripple these systems, they instead stockpile vulnerabilities so that they can exploits them in a time of war. 

Yet other nations, such as Russia, carry out more overt and hostile attacks such as against a nation's political systems. Best seen in the 2016 US Presidential election,during which Russia hacked the DNC to favor the Donald Trump campaign, Russia has in fact been carrying out cyber attacks against the political systems of NATO and Baltic nations for at least a decade. Russia has regularly used its cyber muscle to favor far-right politicians while attacking centrists and liberal candidates. They use their cyber influence to stoke dissent amongst a country's citizens, and to stoke fear and xenophobia which they can channel towards the far-right, nationalistic candidates that they prefer and can thus manipulate on selected into office.

Russia's reach is indeed far, and while their influence on the 2016 election was significant, their best success to date so far may be Britain's Brexit vote, during which they ran disinformation campaigns online to stoke xenophobia. With Brexit being a widely recognized political and economic disaster for Britain, Russia has found great success in its cyber offensive operations. Yet if cyber warfare is so prevalent and has obviously hostile intent, why don't nations react the way they would to kinetic attacks? That's partly to do with the fact that cyber warfare itself is a very new development, and so the international community is at a loss as to how exactly respond to the cyber offenses of another hostile nation. In Russia's example, NATO could react witha kinetic attack against Russia, but politicians must ask themselves if cyber operations aretruly threatening enough to warrant an all-out kinetic war.

When a hostile nation has so clearly meddled in your politics and perhaps set the course of your nation's political leadership, the question may indeed need to be considered a strong yes- after all, just how sovereigns nation are you really if your elected leader is a tool of the Kremlin, or routinely takes action on the international stage that benefit the very nation that is hostile to you and is attacking you every day? There simply exist no clearly defined boundaries between what constitutes a hostile military attack against a nation, and what is simply cyber crime. Currently cyber attacks by hostile nations are lumped together with espionage, crime, and hactivism, and realistically you wouldn't call for an airstrike against a teenager hacking into Papa John's to get themselves free pizza delivered.

You wouldn't do such a thing because it would've an over-reaction, but also because it's completely unrealistic: nobody wants PapaJohns pizza- even if it's free. On a serious note though, our current lack of political will to classify hostile cyber attacks as military actions only leaves nations even more vulnerable to being further attacked.

Russia, emboldened by their 2016 success in the US election, has for instance been widely reported by intelligence agencies around theworld as gearing up for an ever greater campaign against the American voter in 2020. Yet the US has largely been silent in itsresponse to Russian aggression- despite President Obama's expulsion of several Russian diplomats known to be active spies, and an alleged brief cyber attack against Russian systems that led to some Russian computers overheating and melting down.

 Sadly the Trump administration has shown little willingness to punish Russia for its attacks against the US, and not only is the lack ofthe political will to strike back suspicious, but it is also dangerous for the world at large. If the world continues down the road we areon, cyber attacks will only escalate until ending disastrously in an attack that's finally large enough to warrant a military response, starting a large scale war. Yet such an attack will likely be completely devastating to the victimized nation, resulting in major disruptions to its power grid or financial and communication systems, bringing its economy to a screeching halt. 

Perhaps what would be best instead is if cyberattacks were at last met with a significant response, thus marking a clear line in thesand for just how far cyber warfare can be taken before military retaliation is inevitable. But just how deadly could a cyber war reallybe? The answer to that question is in our ownnot too distant past. In the early 2000s before the Iran nuclear deal, Israel was reaching a political crisis point. For its own continued survival it could notallow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, yet with the expansion of several enrichment facilities iran was poised to do just that in a matter of years.

Many inside of Israel saw a preemptive strikeas the best course of option, yet each time Israeli jets had strayed into Iran, they had brought up the possibility of major retaliation. An all-out war between Israel and Iran would have quickly spilled over into other Arab countries, leading to yet another Jew-Arabwar which would have in turn brought in Israel's American and European allies. For the US this situation was completely unacceptable,as was a nuclear Iran. Not only was there the risk of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel, but if Iran was allowed to develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia andJordan both had already stated that they would immediately begin developing their own nuclear weapons as well. 

In short a nuclear iran would lead to a nuclear middle east, the single most volatile region in the entire world. Yet allowing Israel to kick off another majorwar by invading Iran was not a good option either, and with Iran digging its enrichment centrifuges deep underground, simple military strikes would prove fruitless. That's when US and Israeli computer scientistscame forward with a solution. They believed they could infect Iranian computer with a worm that could in turn destroy the Iranian centrifuges, and leave the Iranians one the wiser as to what exactly happened.

 The plan was immediately ok'ed, and working together, US and Israeli engineers developed the Stuxnet virus. However, the centrifuges and the computer network they were linked to were not connected to the internet for obvious security reasons. This means that the virus would have to bebrought in physically and uploaded directly to the secure computer network, and to dothis several Iranian nuclear scientists were singled out and targeted digitally. Eventually the team managed to infect thelaptop of one of the scientists while he was connected to the internet, and when he brought the laptop into the nuclear facility and connected to the network there, the worm hopped inside the secure computer systems and began to wreak havoc.

 Centrifuges began to spin wildly out of control,causing massive destruction and bringing the Iranian nuclear program to its knees. In the end thousands of centrifuges were destroyed,all by the simple click of a button. A modern cyber war could have just as dire,and physical consequences. If infected, the computer systems of nuclear power plants could be shut down, or hijacked completely- hackers could for instance orderthe release of all water in the plant's cooling system, which would lead to a nuclear meltdownof the overheated reactors and regional disasters all across the land. With hundreds of nuclear power plants aroundthe world, this could devastate major portions of most modern nations. 

After the Russians cyber attack

Even conventional power systems could be affected theough with the physical infrastructure overloaded to the point of causing significant structural damage across a nation's power grid. Such a disaster would take weeks, or monthsto repair, and if it happened during winter could lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of the most vulnerable segments of a population. Dams could be hijacked as well, and emergency slices meant to help deal with rising water levels during heavy rains could be forced to remain closed, leading to a collapse of the entire damn. 

This would bring untold devastation as hundreds of millions of gallons of water rushed downstream to overtake the communities living in theshadows of large dams such as the three gorges dam or the Hoover dam. Luckily for us, no nation has yet dared to launch any such attack against the other- save for some cases of tampering of Ukraine's energy grid by Russia. Yet the reality is that in the case of another major war, these types of attacks would be the first to be launched by a hostile power.

 The option is especially attractive for nations such as Russia and China, who find themselves at a considerable military disadvantage against Europe and its American ally, and in the case of war, it's a certainty that some degree of major attack against a nation's digital infrastructure would take place. The unknown question to many though is justhow severe an attack will take place, and how well could a nation weather such an attack. Even more troubling is the fact that many of these attacks could result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions,and yet these cyber weapons are not yet considered weapons of mass destruction.

 If caught unawares and the US is crippled by a cyber attack that leads to millions of incidental deaths, are the leaders of Russia and China confident that American leadership won't consider this an attack by a weapon of mass destruction and retaliate with a nuclear attack? That is the question that haunts many of theworld's premier cyber experts, and sadly, one that we might just have to blunder into in order to find the answer out. The Cyber War will and already is happening and the people who are going to suffer the most are normal users like you. 

The military has whole teams fighting this,what do you have? You don’t need to have the resources of an army to protect yourself. Let us know in the comments, and as always if you enjoyed this article don't forget to Like, Share, and Subscribe for more great content! 

COMCASA and India

COMCASA or CISMOA 

CISMOA stands for Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement. Am feel that this agreement will facilitate interoperability in defence communications. Though preferred to sign CISMOA, India had raised objections to its name and as a result the US chang name to Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement or COMCASA. The aim of CISMO now COMCASA, is to provide India with transfer of high-quality communication security equipment will facilitate interoperability between the Indian and US forces. This US origin system of communicatie security equipment is used for secure data links. If the US will give this equipment to India, India and the US can seek interoperability between forces and also between other countries that use the sameis origin equipment

   COMCASA agreement between India and USA

India's Turning Point

In the strategic community of India, it was believed that the Doklam crisis (2017) was the immediate trigger for India to go for COMCASA. In the Doklam criss (explained in the chapter of India and China Relations), India had no intelligence on the troop movement by China. It was only after the troops came close to the sight of the soldiers on the border did India got m know. This was the time when Indian strategic community realised the significance of US intelligence ort Chinese troop movement had such an arrangement was in place. 

Why the US Wanted India to Sign COMCASA?

india has been using less secure communication security equipment and the US feel that due to such less secure requirements, functional military relations with India will be difficult to build. As the US has granted India a tag of Major Defence Partner' where it will sell high-end defence technology to India, the US feels that absence of COMCASA can be a hurdle for the US to sell MH-60R Multi- will create 2000 jobs in America) Hig role helicopters and twenty-two MQ-9 Sea Guardian (which Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones (a weapon sold previously only to NATO allies) that India wants (to prevent any misadventure by China in the Indian Ocean an another repeat of2 26/11) as they are dependent upon very high-quality secure data and communication systems. The main purpose level are not leaked to any of the US to push India to go for COMCASA was to ensure that its technologies at the military not leaked to third party. India also is dependent on less secure communication system and unable to share real-time data with other friendly states in cases of humanitarian relief operations and defence exercise. The agreement is valid till 2028 and either side can terminate the agreement at any joint, by giving a 6 months notice.

India's Concerns on COMCASA

A. India feels that the US communication equipment is intrusive. It violates Indian sovereignty, as US inspectors, under COMCASA, will have a right to inspect Indian bases that will install such communication equipment. The US has a similar agreement with South Korea and the language of the agreement with South Korea is highly intrusive. Thus, some experts in India feel that India has implicitly accepted the extraterritorial application of American law. This is at variance with end user monitoring agreement (EUMA) between India and US in 2009. The EUMA stated that US inspectors would not inspect Indian bases. The question is what is the status of EUMA and COMCASA? The government has not clarified anything.

B. India also feels that COMCASA equipment will not be compatible to Russian and indigenous Indian military platforms. India's concern is that if they use COMCASA equipment, then the US could monitor Indian activities and this may violate India's sovereignty. Thus, India favours checks and balances to be inbuilt that address Indian concerns. The US has modified the CISMOA to COMCASA where it has categorically asserted that the COMCASA communication links will apply only to the weapons that the US supplies. The US will not be able to share Indian data, from Indian platforms, with any other country and will not access data without permission.

C. The US also is concerned that as India has purchased Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system system so advanced that it can track all aircrafts, UAVs and missiles-it may conflict with US as S-400 can allow Russia to access US information as S-400 Triumf is a mega complex of radars, control systems and missiles. The US has reasons to worry because S-400 can map Americas prior F-35 fighters (which have a unique feature of low observability character) he third concern is that if US installs any communication systems in India under COMCASA, moula it affect and compromise the secrecy of military installations in India?

D. The third concern is that if US installs any communication systems in India under COMCASA, moula it affect and compromise the secrecy of military installations in India?

E. Some experts have raised a question that as US is not going to anyway stand behind India in case of a future conflict, why is such an agreement even needed?