Dealing With the Taliban: India’s Strategy in Afghanistan | Strange Military Stories

India was supportive of the Northern Alliance to counter the weight of Taliban in Afghanistan, and its engagement has broadened post 9/11 attacks in the US, and the consequent ousting of the Taliban by Operation Enduring Freedom of the US. India's diplomatic energy in Afghanistan is invested primarily in enhancing its own interests in Afghanistan.

India's first and most important interest in Afghanistan is to ensure that Pakistan does not gain an edge within governing structures of Afghanistan. India feels that if Pakistan succeeds in installing

Taliban or a Taliban-sponsored regime in Afghanistan, it will be detrimental to the cause of the regional security of India. On the other hand, Pakistan feels that India should not be allowed to get a hold on Afghanistan and perceives any growing Indo-Afghan proximity as an attempt by India to counter Pakistan by maintaining its presence in Afghanistan. Each has tried neutralising the other's influence in governance and management of Afghanistan, leading to a classic security dilemma where any measure by one elicits a counter response from other. Pakistani military has long supported Talibani elements and helped them flourish near the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan and continues to believe that the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan would be the most effective way to undercut Indian influence in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan continues to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan and certainly favours less Indian proximity to Afghanistan. As Karzai rose to power in Afghanistan in the post 2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates give Indian agencies an access to gather intelligence from across the border. Pakistan also alleges that India provides assistance to Balochistani rebels through these consulates. Pakistan has also tried to limit India from undertaking commerce with Afghanistan by refusing to allow transit rights over Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. India has used the alternative route of Iran to reach Afghanistan. As Indian developmental activities continue in Afghanistan, India has realised the need to protect its Border Road Organisation personnel by using the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is stationed in Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan and certainly favours less Indian proximity to Afghanistan. As Karzai rose to power in Afghanistan in the post 2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates give Indian agencies an access to gather intelligence from across the border, Pakistan also alleges that India provides assistance to Balochistani rebels through these consulates, Pakistan has also tried to limit India from undertaking commerce with Afghanistan by refusing to allow transit rights over Pakistan to reach Afghanistan.

India has used the alternative route of Iran to reach Afghanistan. As Indian developmental activities continue in Afghanistan, India has realised the need to protect its Border Road Organisation personnel by using the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is stationed in Afghanistan. Despite all tactics adopted by Pakistan to keep India out of Afghanistan, India continues to deepen its ties with the region by engaging with Afghanistan. Apart from ensuring that the region does not fall into the orbit of Pakistan giving it leverage against India, another crucial policy determinant of India in Afghanistan is to ensure zero spillover of extremists to India.

India has been a victim of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan and engages with Afghanistan to ensure no spillover of extremism or Islamic radicalism happens in India. If Pakistan succeeds in helping the Taliban establish a footing in Afghanistan, this would enable Pakistan to train extremists and militants in the uncontrolled Taliban region and use them against India and more specifically, against Kashmir. In fact, at present, the extremists fighting in Kashmir owe their patronage mostly to Pakistan's ISI and have drawn inspiration from the resistance offered by Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets during the Cold War. 

India was under the impression that after 9/11, the US would put pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the jihadi networks that operate from Pakistan, considering that India to had even continues to use jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region. been a victim of terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil. However, a reluctant approach by Islamabad camp down on the jihadi cells in their territory has given the jihadis the needed space for growth. Pakistan jivan continue to use jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region.

Afganistan Pakistan :Domination over Durand line

The Afghanistan and Pakistan relation have been strained since 1947. The reason is the perception over the Durand Line. The British established it in 1893, which Afghanistan has refused to accept as the border. In September 1947 due to its rejection of the Durand Line Afghanistan even opposed the entry of Pakistan to the United Nations. Afghanistan rejected the line as it believed that the British imposed the line.

 In 1947, not only Afghanistan wanted to undo the line but they also wanted Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pashtunistan or KP region) and Balochistan as part Afghanistan, both of which were forcibly incorporated by Pakistan. Though Pakistan accepts the Durand Line as the border, Afghanistan has rejected it, making Pakistan insecure as it feels that Afghanistan can resort design to seek the territory back one day. For long, Pakistan has aimed to make Durand Line as the border and make Afghanistan accept the same, but Pakistan has met constant failure to do so, even with no success when Taliban (which was created by Pakistan) remained in power from 1996 to 2001. 

Since 2001, Pakistan has followed a two-point strategy. Firstly, it favours a weak and not a strong government in Afghanistan. The Pakistani assumption is that such a weak government Afghanistan can never resort to a revanchist design against Pakistan and seek Khyber Pakhtun or Baluchistan bark for Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan does not favour a strong India-Afghanistan relation as it fears that a strong Afghanistan and India relationship will encourage Afghanistan to resort to a revanchist design again. This is why Pakistan maintains a strategic depth against India in Afghanistan. 

While trying to achieve the two stated objectives, Pakistan has committed many blunders. During the Cold War, they perceived Afghans as Soviet stooges and insufficient Muslims for their deflection towards Soviets. Today,Pakistan perceives them as Indian stooges. As the state of Pakistan has never looked at Afghanistan as land of ethnic Afghan people, it has generated tremendous hatred among the local Afghans against Pakistan. Pakistan still hopes to achieve a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan as such a government is a guarantee against the revanchist designs, keeps India away from Afghanistan and also provides a fertile ground for Pakistan to channelise their madrassa products to train them for Jihad.

Pakistan has followed a policy of arming and supporting dissidents in Afghanistan who are opposed to the West-sponsored democratic government in Afghanistan since 2001. As Pakistan has understood, over a period of time, that they cannot forcibly bring Taliban (Pakistan trump card) into Afghanistan, they have adopted the tactic of bringing Taliban as a political player in the future of Afghanistan.

     Zalmay khalilzad after Taliban deal in doha

The recent troop withdrawal by the US in Afghanistan announced by Trump and negotiations with Taliban led by Zalmay Khalilzad is an attempt by Pakistan to politically accommodate Taliban in Afghanistan after the US leaves Afghanistan.  ( US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar sign a peace agreement in doha) But Pakistan fails to understand that even if Taliban comes to power again in Afghanistan, it will be a threat to Pakistan itself, as it will try to impose its own version of Islam , which will threaten Pakistan, as Pakistan does not have a strong Islamic identity. Also, Taliban is to reassert the demand for Pashtunistan, which will be the nemesis for Pakistan. If Taliban come it will only lead to Talibanisation of Pakistan, which will not only be detrimental for its own future, dental its own future, but will also reverse the strategic depth policy Pakistan practices. 

At one place Pakistan itself is a revanchist state that wants territorial boundaries in Kashmir. On the other hand, it is itself a victim of a larger revanchist design by Afghanistan where it may lose a substantial territory. This is a conundrum that Pakistan will continue to face in its future. Pakistan is unable to learn from history that no one can subjugate the afghans. The British (after The Great Game), the USSR (during the Cold War) and the US (in its Global War on Terror- realised that Afghanistan was their twenty-first century Vietnam) have learnt, minus Pakistan, which still hopes that a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan will toe line to Pakistan. This s nothing but a unreality.

Also read the talk and fight stretegy of Taliban

Talk and fight: strategy of Taliban in Afganistan

Background

The US in 2018 appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as its chief negotiator and special representative with the Taliban. Trump has thrown Afghanistan into an epic scrum by his logic that great nations do not fight endless wars. 

The ground situation in 2019 is that the Taliban controls 15 per cent Afghan lands, the Afghan government holds 56 per cent, while 39 per cent is contested between the Afghan government and Taliban. 

 Zalmay Khalilzad

The Taliban and the US reached a deal (in April 2019) that is pregnant with positivity. As per the deal, it is believed that the Taliban will not use Afghanistan to target the US and its allies, while there will be completely foreign troop withdrawal from the soil of Afghanistan. 

USA Taliban Deal

As per the package deal', the Taliban (stated through its negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar) will not develop any links with international terror groups not allow Afghan territory to be used for any strikes against the ost Under the deal, Zalmay Khalilzad stated that there will be a dialogue of Taliban with 'intra-Afghan' forces. This is very important because Zalmay Khalilzad did not use the term 'national unity government NUG-led by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, a legitimate democratic government) and the Taliban.

                            
This means that the Taliban will not negotiate with NUG (which India favours) but with diverse factions of Afghan society (which Pakistan or ISI favours). This will not only erode the significance of a democratically elected government but also create fissures in Afghan society and the future government will be very hybrid. The problem is that NUG also is not fully united. On top of that, if the Taliban establishes control over any region in the country, it will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to use proxies and unleash strategic depth against India. 

Talk and Fight Strategy

Taliban is trying to convince the US and India (through its spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid) that it is an independent actor and not a creature of Pakistan. However, the future of Afghanistan because of all this remains very vulnerable and volatile. However, the strategy of the Taliban is that at one place it will continue to fight foreign troops and simultaneously talk to the US. This is called the 'talk and fight' approach. 

However, the Taliban has remained steadfast on their demand for not negotiating with the Afghan government and not accepting the ceasefire with the Afghan government. The Taliban and the US have agreed for an interim government where there shall be gradual power-sharing between the Afghan government and Taliban. There will be an interim constitution that will discuss changes to the Afghan Constitution. There will an Ulema Council that shall be created to discuss power-sharing.

Pakistani Jihad 

Taliban is an ideological movement and not a nationalist insurgency. The strength of the Taliban comes from the US and Saudi support for Jihad' in the Cold War period, Pashtun, and opposition to foreign troops (British earlier, to the USSR and the US today). Taliban rose easily in 1994 to recreate the 300-year history that was dominated by Pashtuns but threatened after Soviet withdrawal, because of a fear of dominance of Persian-speaking Tajiks (close to Iran and dominant in Afghan bureaucracy for long). 

Pakistan at the end of the Cold War feared that a Tajik-dominated government in Afghanistan will be the nemesis for Pakistan (as it feared it could be micromanaged by Iran, even giving leverage to India in the long run in Afghanistan), thus, Pakistan was the Pashtuns in the theme of historical recreation and became the progenitor of Taliban. Its objective is to establish a 'pure Islamic government', which is aligned to the geostrategic ambitions of Pakistan. Taliban has always perceived Afghanistan as 'the school of jihad'.