Dealing With the Taliban: India’s Strategy in Afghanistan | Strange Military Stories

India was supportive of the Northern Alliance to counter the weight of Taliban in Afghanistan, and its engagement has broadened post 9/11 attacks in the US, and the consequent ousting of the Taliban by Operation Enduring Freedom of the US. India's diplomatic energy in Afghanistan is invested primarily in enhancing its own interests in Afghanistan.

India's first and most important interest in Afghanistan is to ensure that Pakistan does not gain an edge within governing structures of Afghanistan. India feels that if Pakistan succeeds in installing

Taliban or a Taliban-sponsored regime in Afghanistan, it will be detrimental to the cause of the regional security of India. On the other hand, Pakistan feels that India should not be allowed to get a hold on Afghanistan and perceives any growing Indo-Afghan proximity as an attempt by India to counter Pakistan by maintaining its presence in Afghanistan. Each has tried neutralising the other's influence in governance and management of Afghanistan, leading to a classic security dilemma where any measure by one elicits a counter response from other. Pakistani military has long supported Talibani elements and helped them flourish near the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan and continues to believe that the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan would be the most effective way to undercut Indian influence in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan continues to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan and certainly favours less Indian proximity to Afghanistan. As Karzai rose to power in Afghanistan in the post 2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates give Indian agencies an access to gather intelligence from across the border. Pakistan also alleges that India provides assistance to Balochistani rebels through these consulates. Pakistan has also tried to limit India from undertaking commerce with Afghanistan by refusing to allow transit rights over Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. India has used the alternative route of Iran to reach Afghanistan. As Indian developmental activities continue in Afghanistan, India has realised the need to protect its Border Road Organisation personnel by using the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is stationed in Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan and certainly favours less Indian proximity to Afghanistan. As Karzai rose to power in Afghanistan in the post 2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates give Indian agencies an access to gather intelligence from across the border, Pakistan also alleges that India provides assistance to Balochistani rebels through these consulates, Pakistan has also tried to limit India from undertaking commerce with Afghanistan by refusing to allow transit rights over Pakistan to reach Afghanistan.

India has used the alternative route of Iran to reach Afghanistan. As Indian developmental activities continue in Afghanistan, India has realised the need to protect its Border Road Organisation personnel by using the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is stationed in Afghanistan. Despite all tactics adopted by Pakistan to keep India out of Afghanistan, India continues to deepen its ties with the region by engaging with Afghanistan. Apart from ensuring that the region does not fall into the orbit of Pakistan giving it leverage against India, another crucial policy determinant of India in Afghanistan is to ensure zero spillover of extremists to India.

India has been a victim of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan and engages with Afghanistan to ensure no spillover of extremism or Islamic radicalism happens in India. If Pakistan succeeds in helping the Taliban establish a footing in Afghanistan, this would enable Pakistan to train extremists and militants in the uncontrolled Taliban region and use them against India and more specifically, against Kashmir. In fact, at present, the extremists fighting in Kashmir owe their patronage mostly to Pakistan's ISI and have drawn inspiration from the resistance offered by Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets during the Cold War. 

India was under the impression that after 9/11, the US would put pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the jihadi networks that operate from Pakistan, considering that India to had even continues to use jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region. been a victim of terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil. However, a reluctant approach by Islamabad camp down on the jihadi cells in their territory has given the jihadis the needed space for growth. Pakistan jivan continue to use jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region.

Taliban,India and IC 814

In 1994, Masood Azhar was travelling in an auto rickshaw with Sajjad Afghani. At that time, Masood was a part of a group called Harkat-ul-Ansar, while Sajjad Afghani was a part of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM).

                         Masood Azhar

                              Sajjad afghani

The the military intelligence was intercepting both of them. They were both arrested after a small chase at Khanabal Chowk, Anantnag, Kashmir. They were both sent to Jammu for interrogation. Immediately after their arrest, Ajit Dovel was one of the officials who played a very crucial role in the interrogation of Masood. Ajit Dovel says that Masood was initially very rigid and was unwilling to speak out to the Indian army regarding any information after his arrest. One of the Army jawan ended up in slapping him hard undercover sti, Masood did not breakdown, This was the time New Delhi recalled Dovel  (who was on an mission in London) to interrogate Masood at Kot Bhalwal Jail in Jammu. Dovel recalls that when he Masood for the first time, Masood complained to him that he had never been slapped by his father but by an Indian Army jawan. Dovel showed him the picture of Omar Saeed Sheikh and Ilyas Kashmiri. Be of them had a relationship with Masood and Dovel wanted to know the relationship. Masood opened up in front of dovel. During interrogation, Masood told Dovel that he had landed in India through a fake Portuguese passport and ISI had instructed him to carry out the merger of HuM and harkat-ul-jihad-E-Islami (HUJI), led by Nasrullah Manzoor Langaryar, who was also in the Indian custody. Dovel says that in 1995, a group called Al Faran (led by Abdul Hamid al-Turki) and created by the ISI, as a shadow group sought the release of Masood Azhar. When Dovel asked Masood about Abdul Hamid al-Turki, Masood said that Turki was a man of low intellect and one who had been a Turkish national and presently living in Anantnag. The army used this input of Masood and on 4 December 1995, army killed Turki in an operation in Anantnag. However, Dovel asserts that throughout his interrogation, Masood always asserted that India is underestimating the popularity of Masood. He used to say that ISI would do anything and everything to secure his release. 

Dovel says that probably, the words of Azhar proved out to be prophetic and on 31 December 1999, in return for passengers of IC 814 (an Indian Airlines aircraft hijacked by the ISI and taken to Kandahar), Masood was released. Mullah Mansoor (Minister of Civil Aviation of afganistan 1996-2001) in Pakistan at that time observed that moment Masood reached Pakistan, he was declared the ultimate Ghazi' against India and ISI handed over to him all the training camps cadre of HuM. The cadre was now merged into a new group called Jaish-e-Mohammad. Dovel was sent to Pakistan in 2000 on a diplomatic cover. Dovel says that one day he was on his way to his office (Indian High Commission) when the vehicles on the road were stopped for allowing a convoy to pass. As Dovel sat in his car, he saw a convoy of Toyota vehicles with Masood Azhar branding Kalashnikov going towards the Lal Masjid. Dovel says that thankfully Masood Azhar did not see him in the car!

Ajit Dovel with Masood Azhar (white turban), Omar Sheikh & Mushtaq Zargar in Kandhar

The IC 814 incident not only cemented the Pakistan-Taliban nexus but also was an eye opener for India. India realised its strategic failure of not being able to establish contacts with Taliban. But, a per Mullah mansoor the IC 814 incident also softened India's stand on Taliban as India realised that Taliban had no role to play in executing the IC 814 incident, which was solely the brain of ISI. X and Z say that Taliban was reluctant to allow IC 814 to even land in Kandahar, but the ISI put its foot do his also helped India realise that Taliban was not a threat to India. Mullah mansoor says that Taliban may supported by Pakistan but they are not bondage of Pakistan, Taliban has never fought in Kashmir they do condemn violence by India in Kashmir, but they favour a peaceful dialogue. In fact, Dovel so that Taliban has never waged a jihad against India. All these helped India to gradually change tie Perception of Taliban.

               Mullah mansour(leader of Taliban )