Chinese Attempt at Brinkmanship

For the fifth month running, the Indo-China confrontation in East Ladakh is keeping the nation on tenterhooks in the midst of an increasingly difficult COVID-19 situation and feeble national economic revival reports. While the jury is still out on what exactly impelled the Chinese to undertake the Ladakh adventure, most agree that they have not been able to achieve all that they had set out to. However, certain aspects of the ongoing confrontation stand out, which we would do well to remember for the future.

Indian soldiers walk at the foothills of a mountain range near Leh.

Perhaps the most important takeaway in dealing with China for the last 30 years has been a peep into their efforts at perfecting the art of brinkmanship. Short of going to war, it is the ability to so pressurise an adversary by use of threats of undisclosed consequences that he either is coerced to give in or be prepared to face the consequences. If he blinks, the battle is won without firing a shot. That would be in line with Sun Tzu’s famous teaching. However, if he does not blink, the ability to step back without losing face or initiative would define brinkmanship at its best.

Prior to Second World War, Germany tried it successfully to subjugate some of its smaller neighbours. During the Cuban Missile crisis, the Russians were forced to blink and withdraw their missiles from Cuba when the US threatened an all out war.

In the past, the Chinese have at the operational level, indulged in brinkmanship along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and succeeded at times. However, whenever the Indian side has firmly opposed them, they have stepped back. In 2013 in Depsang, 2014 at Chumar and 2017 at Doklam, they blinked and withdrew when India stood firm and refused to cave in.

Even at the international level, in attempting to legitimise the Nine Dash Line in South China Sea (SCS) there is a design to indulge in brinkmanship in consonance with their expansionist philosophy. As their power grows, their aggressive stance manifests itself in pushing the boundaries of brinkmanship. Violation of Taiwanese air space and territorial waters of Japanese Senkaku Islands are clear examples.

Getting back to India-China faceoff in Ladakh, it is a well documented fact that the Chinese have been spending approximately three and half times more than India on their defence forces for over two decades now. This has created a capability gap between the two sides, which though recognised by the strategic community, is not fully appreciated by the public at large as well as a section of the Indian media. Thus, while the strategic community resorts to abundant and at times excessive caution in dealing with china militarily and diplomatically, the nationalistic media stirs up public passion baying for revenge and blood. A solution needs to be found between these two extremes in the interest of national security.

Even though the current Chinese aggression is top driven with elaborate military preparations, its brinkmanship is unlikely to succeed due to a variety of reasons. Firstly, there are a finite number of troops that are deployable along an approach in mountains. Any further increase would prove counterproductive leading to probability of greater casualties. Thus, the Chinese advantage of greater numbers is nullified.

Secondly, an attacker needs at least a six to one superiority of numbers to succeed in mountains even with all the superior firepower at his disposal. In a situation like the present in East Ladakh with both sides having approximately equal number of troops, the chances of a major success by either side are very low.

Thirdly, the last conventional battle fought by the Chinese troops was in 1979 against Vietnam, where they received a bloody nose. It is worth noting that the PLA is a conscript army where 35 per cent of the soldiers are enlisted for just two years service including the training period. Thereafter, they go back to civilian occupations. It is inconceivable that they can be a match to professional Indian soldiers who join voluntarily and serve in varied terrain, including high altitude areas, for a minimum of 18 years. Thus, while the Chinese may boast of superior weaponry, the man behind the weapon has a crucial role to play in determining the outcome of a serious confrontation.

Since the events of August 29-30 south of Pangong Tso, the past few weeks have seen the Chinese media resorting to daily threats of Indian capitulation a-la-1962. Physical attempts at dislodging the Indian Army soldiers by use of spears, machetes or firing of warning shots in the air have not worked either. Parading of mechanised columns including tanks close to Spanggur gap has also not produced the desired fear in Indian soldiers.

To make matters worse for the Chinese, occupation of dominating heights above Fingers 3 and 4 on the North bank by the Indian Army has increased the Chinese vulnerability.

It would thus be fare to conclude that brinkmanship, unless consistently backed by a credible threat capability would have little chance of success while dealing with a professionally capable opposition. Hopefully, this realisation would sink in the Chinese mind during the ongoing military and diplomatic discussions to resolve the imbroglio before winter sets in.